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Democracy and the Politics
of Inclusion
Held argues that a ‘‘fair framework’ for the regulation of
a community is one that is freely chosen’ and that
members of a political community – citizens –
should be able to choose freely the conditions of their own association, and
that their choices should constitute the ultimate legitimation of the form and
direction of their polity.
So there is a
democratic parallel with indigeneity’s concern for personal and collective
freedom and an obvious theoretical convergence between these two concepts of
power and authority. All encompassing democratic practices limit the power of
elites to exclude. Exclusion is not the point of democracy. But at the same
time the concept can be more narrowly interpreted to restrict the terms of
public engagement in decision-making, even to the point that for minority
indigenous groups assimilation into a culturally homogenous polity is
positioned as an essential and necessary precondition for full democratic
participation. The former Australian Prime Minister, John Howard (1996-2007), developed a powerful assimilationist narrative
to counter growing demands for indigenous self-determination: ‘Son you’re
Australian; that’s enough for anyone to be became a simple theme of his Prime
Ministership. He was untroubled by the
intellectual conflict between socially conservative emphases on homogeneity and
the liberal emphases on freedom. Reconciliation and assimilation became the
opposite sides of a nationally polarizing debate which contrasted limiting with
expansive democratic interpretations.
Underlying the assimilationist narrative was a normative racism as
‘cultural artefact’
meaning that it stands to reason that prejudice influences the ends to which
democracy is ordered. But even so it is not true that the modern state is
necessarily ‘a compulsory association which organises domination.
Democracy, in fact, constrains the capacity of post-colonial states to
dominate, and while the state does monopolise coercive power
coercion is not always and necessarily negative for indigenous peoples. For example, guaranteed Maori representation in the New Zealand
Parliament and the enactment of settlements to grievances under the Treaty of
Waitangi when simple majority vote is likely to have prevented either in spite
of their foundation in justice and contribution to social stability and
cohesion. In recent Australian history it has been the coercive power of the
judicial system that has imposed incremental developments in indigenous legal
rights on unsympathetic governments. In both cases coercion is justified to
pursue fundamentally just objectives over simple populism. There is consequently pragmatic truth in the
general observation that: ‘While the state is the burden individuals have to
bear to secure their own ends, it is also the basis on which it is possible to
safeguard their claims to equal rights and liberties . The
limiting factor is that democracy only safeguards the right to make these
claims; it does not guarantee a political order that will ensure indigenous
perceptions of equality and liberty, which are themselves contested.
Liberal
political theory developed to respond to religious diversity. It follows that it
ought to be able to consider the political and constitutional implications of
ethnic diversity. Its purpose is
to mediate rather than to mask difference and to resolve not dismiss
conflicting ideas.
Men have different views on the empirical end of happiness, and what
it consists of, so that as far as happiness is concerned, their will cannot be
brought under any common principle, nor thus under an external law harmonizing
with the freedom of everyone.
Recognising
difference does not counter liberalism’s sacrosanct protection of individual
rights. Individual identity must come from somewhere. It is heavily shaped by
culture and derives meaning from communal relationships. Differences in
political identities contribute to the differences in ideas that democracy is
intended to mediate. The ideas that compete for popular ascendency are not
confined to abstract philosophical positions; they include the simple
proposition that indigenous perspectives ought to be seen and heard in the
wider body politic.
The unity of society and the allegiance of its citizens to their
common institutions rest not on their espousing one rational conception of the
good, but on an agreement as to what is just for free and equal moral persons
with different and opposing conceptions of the good.
Indigeneity’s
concern with collective rights means that it is also inevitably interested in
correcting the effects of colonisation as a serious violation of individual
liberty. Indigeneity gives theoretical expression to the recognition of
differences based on first occupancy. Its interpretation of political rights
evolves in response to its theoretical and political interactions with other
discourses; its potency is a function of its engagement with liberal democracy
as the prevailing internationally accepted framework of state governance. Together
they create opportunities for indigenous peoples to articulate their own
conceptions of justice, and democracy is crafted towards its inclusive
potential. Indigeneity is concerned with differentiation from the wider polity,
but this does not inevitably or necessarily require political separation.
Instead
one of the interesting consequences of the encounter between
liberalism and its colonial past and present might be a more context-sensitive
and multilayered approach to questions of justice, identity, democracy and
sovereignty. The result would be a political theory open to new modes of cultural
and political belonging.
Such a theory
can accord with indigenous aspirations because there need not be any
inconsistency between collective group rights and the sovereignty of the total
polity. Kymlicka’s argument that the paradigm shift from democracy ‘suppressing
to accomodating’ minority ethnic groups in the United States of America has
‘actually played a vital role in consolidating and deepening democracy can
be translated into indigenous contexts to add to the rationales for guaranteed
indigenous parliamentary representation in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, for
example. In these contexts emphasis on individual rights in isolation from the
collective offers no real prospect for securing comprehensive individual
freedom or the certainty of equal individual influence over the polity.
Held outlines four democratic criteria which would, if applied
consistently and universally, make states more responsive to indigenous
aspirations. Democracy should provide for:
Protection from the arbitrary use of political authority and coercive
power…
The involvement of citizens in the
determination of the conditions of their association through the provision of
their consent in the maintenance and legitimation of regulative institutions…
The creation of the best circumstances for
citizens to develop their nature and express their diverse qualities…
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