The limits of democracy

The limits of democracy

Alley’s assessment of political tensions between paramountcy and democracy in Fiji in 2000 parallels the outbreak of ethnic violence in KwaZulu-Natal in 2008.

While Speight’s hostage-taking lacked the endorsement from indigenous Fijians that his backers claimed, the bored, aimless, unemployed, and poorly educated rallied in number to the clarion of ethnic demagoguery. This signified an erosion of the respect previously paid to indigenous national leaders now perceived as corrupt, incompetent, and unable to discharge customary responsibilities to ordinary Fijians in a market economy under the rule of law.

The apartheid state’s legacy was also a very poor, uneducated and angry population making it difficult to acquire the ‘workable moral consensus’ needed to secure South Africa’s future. As in other post-colonial societies there needs to be some reconciliation of the aspirations of those previously excluded with the interests and indeed rights of those traditionally privileged. At the same time, although indigenous South Africans are a significant majority population there are institutional weaknesses in the country’s democracy which undermine the connection between that concept and self-determination.

When the ban on the liberation movements was lifted in 1990 the ANC began a transformation from political agitator to political party seeking government of a nation state morally and economically crippled by its history. The enormity of the transition shows in the ANCs failure to make significant progress in the critical areas of economic and social reform. It had no plan

for the practical implementation of anything except donning the mantle of power after centuries of colonialism and oppression. There was a strangely naive expectation that the abolition of apartheid in itself would put an end to black economic deprivation.

Jacob Zuma’s election to the ANC presidency in 2008, in spite of his alleged wide-scale corruption, shows that there remains personal and tribal rather than policy bases to intra-party power relationships. Indeed, its intra-party democracy is weak and there is no serious alternative government. Substantive checks on power and ‘accountability, transparency and active engagement with the people’ do not, therefore, feature strongly in domestic political relationships.

Intra-party democracy subjects policy decisions to wider scrutiny which is preliminary to ‘the ability of ordinary... citizens to make decisions for their own good.  As Gumede argues, if there had been greater internal debate, South Africa may not have lost 500,000 jobs in five years and if the ARV AIDS drug had been made available five years earlier thousands of lives might have been saved Policy failures of this magnitude inevitably undermine democracy itself.

The less the ANC can offer a convincing and effective strategy for improving the material situation of the black masses, the more many of the most wretched and impoverished members of the population are likely to look to alternative ethnic solutions, which, however retrograde, offer both psychological comfort and, often, immediate economic relief.

It is, however, misleading to suggest that ‘those who suffered the worst deprivation under apartheid also ended up paying the highest price for democracy. Aparthied’s legacy remains among the most significant constraints on black economic and political advancement. Democracy does not explain why the people who suffered the most under apartheid remain the most disadvantaged. When the two are compared as if they are equally legitimate alternatives the potential of one and the evil of the other are diminished. Most importantly, however:

Should a new opposition emerge that is prepared to speak out for social justice, redistribution and a better lot for the poor, the... ANC could find itself in real trouble. There is neither an ideological nor a cultural guarantee that the nation will stand together, and South Africa’s salvation will lie in a broad nationalism that not only accommodates its diversity, but addresses the fears and needs of all its citizens.

The absence of serious opposition negatively impacts upon South Africa’s democratic functioning. Although Mattison does suggest there may be some ‘unexpected democracy deepening consequences of one-party dominance’ which mitigate against the possibility of degeneration ‘into hegemonic one-party rule. The argument is that because alternative positions are not meaningfully expressed by opposition political parties; civil society steps in to fill the void and is itself strengthened in the process. The Mbeki Government’s (1999-2008) inept handling of the HIV/AIDS crisis is a case in point. The government was challenged by a successful civil partnership among churches, trade unions and the media which ‘held the government to the ideals and values entrenched in, and protected by, the Constitution. As the example illustrates, there is much more to democracy than electoral systems and procedures for the formation of governments. Civil society’s capacity to influence from outside the legislature is important especially where one political party dominates to the extent of the ANC:

if citizens are encouraged to see that their participation can make a substantive difference, they can provide the countervailing power to check the government until such time as this can be provided by conventional party politics.

The debate showed the limits of a politics of indigeneity that is concerned only with the acquisition of power. But a strong civil society is not a substitute for an electoral system that ensures a contested political voice for the most vulnerable.